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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW –2010 UPDATE
By Thomas A. Daily1
Believe it or not, it’s time for this again. There is a problem with time
enjoyed–gone before you realize. 2009 was an interesting and busy year, as you will
see. Here is what happened in Arkansas Natural Resources Law, with just a couple of
important notes from other jurisdictions. For those of us with baby boomer eyes, I have
broken with Bluebook and bolded the names of the new stuff.
RECENT LEGISLATION
The 2009 session of the Arkansas General Assembly came and went with its
usual offering of scary bills. As is typical, we saw proposals to terminate “dormant”
mineral interests, severely restrict surface operations, deny eminent domain power to
developers of gas gathering systems, make garbage of ownership of minerals under
lands subject to contracts of sale–all the usual stuff that our citizen legislators feel they
need to offer up, in order to pander to folks back home. Fortunately, none became law.
Those few bills which did become acts are these:
Act No. 719 of 20092 defines the “prudent operator” standard under an oil and
gas lease. The act expressly states that a lessee/working interest owner is not a
fiduciary. The owner does owe an obligation to perform the “covenants of the lease”3 in
good faith and to develop the leased mineral estate as a prudent operator for the
parties’ mutual benefit. That is pretty much what I thought the law already was, before
someone went to all this trouble in the legislature. Apparently, its backers were
1

Member, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Fort Smith, Arkansas.

2

Now codified as A.C.A. § 15-73-207.

3

Including, it is assumed, implied lease covenants.

spooked by some of the loose language within the Supreme Court’s opinion in SEECO,
Inc. v. Hales.4 If that is true, they are just scratching the surface. That opinion has
enough loose language to justify its own special session.
Act No. 1183 of 20095 requires that an oil and gas lessor be given notice of the
first assignment of his lease, if the assignment occurs within 24 months after the lease’s
execution. It applies, prospectively, only to leases entered into after August 1, 2009.
The notice is required to contain the name, address and contact information for the
“buyer”6 of the lease and must be sent by first class United States mail. No sanctions
for failure to comply are contained within the act.
Act No. 421 of 20097 is my personal favorite of all of the 2009 Legislature’s
work. That act sets the ad valorem tax value of a non-producing mineral interest at
“zero (0) value.”8 The purpose of this much-needed piece of legislation is to cure an
obvious illegality in the ad valorem taxation of mineral interests. Previously, many
counties attempted, however clumsily, to tax non-producing mineral interests when
severed from the surface, but never thought to increase the assessment of a tract with
unsevered minerals to reflect the additional value attributable to its unsevered mineral
interest. That was a clear violation of the requirement of Article 16, Section 5 of the

4

341 Ark. 673, 22 S.W.3d 157 (2000).

5

Now codified as A.C.A. § 15-73-208.

6

Presumably the first assignee.

7

Now codified as part of A.C.A. § 26-26-1110.

8

My apologies for this footnote. I am always amused by the Legislature’s
apparent need to clarify the meaning of a prime number or, in this case, non-number.
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Arkansas Constitution:
(a) All real and tangible personal property subject to taxation shall be
taxed according to its value, that value to be ascertained in such manner
as the General Assembly shall direct, making the same equal and uniform
throughout the State. No one species of property for which a tax may be
collected shall be taxed higher than another species of property of equal
value, except as provided and authorized in Section 15 of this Article, and
except as authorized in Section 14 of this Article. The General Assembly,
upon the approval thereof by a vote of not less than three-fourths (3/4ths)9
of the members elected to each house, may establish the methods and
procedures for valuation of property for taxation purposes, but may not
alter the method of valuation set forth in Section 15 of this Article.
(b) The following property shall be exempt from taxation: public property
used exclusively for public purposes; churches used as such; cemeteries
used exclusively as such; school buildings and apparatus; libraries and
grounds used exclusively for school purposes; and buildings and grounds
and materials used exclusively for public charity. Nothing in this Section
shall affect or repeal the provision of Amendment 57 to the Constitution of
the State of Arkansas pertaining to intangible personal property. [Added
by Const. Amend. 59.]
The change is clearly for the good. The only question is whether the Legislature
may constitutionally do what it has done. Sadly, the property tax is hard-coded into this
state’s constitution. I have confirmed that the act received the 3/4 vote required by
Section (a) above. The only question is whether it is really a “method and procedure”
rather than an exemption, which can only be accomplished by constitutional
amendment to Section (b). I, for one,10 do not intend to complain.
Act No. 1175 of 2009 was an Oil and Gas Commission sponsored bill which
made numerous technical changes to Arkansas’ oil and gas statutes. Its most notable
sections are Section 1, which clarified that five affirmative votes are required for the

9

Id., as to a simple Fourth (4th) Grade fraction.

10

(1).
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Commission to issue an order, and Sections 15 and 17 which amended A.C.A. § 15-72304 and A.C.A. § 15-74-604, respectively, to permit royalty or other proceeds of
production to accumulate up to $100 before requiring payment. These latter sections
bring the amended statutes into conformance with A.C.A. § 15-74-601(b)(2), which was
similarly amended by Act No. 276 of 2003. Apparently whoever authored the 2003
legislation failed to realize that the minimum payment requirement appears in three
separate code sections.
A similar act is Act No. 389 of 200911 which reduces the qualifying age of an oil
and gas commissioner from 30 to 21 and requires that a majority of those12 be persons
“experienced in development, production or transportation of oil or gas.” That simple
little bill, suggested because the previous law had not been revised when the
Commission was expanded from seven to nine members, caused more controversy,
both in and out of industry, than the rest of the oil and gas bills, good ones and bad,
combined.13
Finally, Act No. 452 of 200914 transferred certain authority to enforce the Federal
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 from the Arkansas Public Service Commission
to the Oil and Gas Commission. The Oil and Gas Commission gained jurisdiction over
pipelines whose owners are either gas production companies or their affiliates and are

11

Amending A.C.A. § 15-71-102 (b).

12

The previous version said “four.”

13

Go figure.

14

Amending A.C.A. § 15-71-110 (d)(18).
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neither gas public utilities nor affiliates thereof.
RECENT CASES
The Fayetteville Shale Play covers several central Arkansas counties which lack
the long history of oil and gas production which exists in the ArkLaTex region in
southwest and the Arkoma Basin in west central Arkansas. It was inevitable, then, that
legal issues, long thought resolved in those traditional producing areas, would be
litigated anew, if for no other reason than to convince a whole new bunch of lawyers
what the law is.
It is only natural that we are seeing a raft of Strohacker tests. For anyone who
may not remember, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Strohacker,15 and other
Strohacker cases which followed,16 deal with the legal meaning of the word “mineral(s)”
when used in a grant or reservation, without specifying which mineral(s) are granted or
reserved. Most, but not all, of these cases involve oil and gas’ inclusion into the
definition of “mineral(s),” as used in early conveyances out of Arkansas’ land-grant
railroads. Strohacker tests whether the substance at issue was within the
contemplation of legal and commercial usage at the time and place of the grant or
reservation involved in the current litigation. It differs from the more mainstream

15

202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941).

16

The best compilation and explanation of these cases ever written is in Gerald
De Lung’s article, The Strohacker Doctrine–An Arkansas Rule of Property, which
was presented at the 1975 version of this institute and was then published in the July
1975 issue of Arkansas Lawyer magazine.
-5-

“Natural Meaning” test utilized in Texas17 in that the local test of Strohacker is as of the
time of the grant or reservation, rather than the time of trial.
Thus, since Strohacker and its progeny require a county-by-county inquiry as to
the approximate date those legal and commercial folks listed oil and gas among
“minerals,” it makes perfect sense that the shale play has spawned a whole new round
of Strohacker litigation. Still, the current crop of Strohacker cases look a little bit off-thewall. Rather than revolving around the time period, 1890-1910, they involve
reservations in deeds executed in the 1930's. Further, either I or counsel for the
surface owners in the current cases woefully misunderstand Strohacker. Those
counsel seem focused upon the fact that oil and gas were not commercially
produced in central Arkansas in the 1930's. Therefore, they leap to conclude that
reservations which did not name oil and gas, by name, did not include them.
I believe that reasoning is faulty. Strohacker’s test has little or nothing to do with
production.18 Rather, the question is: When did those thinkers whose thinking counts,
those legal and commercial folks, begin to conjure oil and gas in their mental picture of
a mineral buffet line?
Oil and gas were discovered in this country before the Civil War. They were first
produced and consumed in parts of Arkansas, though minimally, before 1900.
Strohacker, itself, was decided in 1941. By the 1930's there was a well-established oil

17

See Moser v. United States Steel, Corp. 27 Tex. Sup. J. 473, 676 S.W.2d 99

(1984).
18

Production only matters to the extent it affected “legal and commercial”
understanding of the term “mineral(s).”
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and gas industry both in South Arkansas and immediately west of the counties now at
issue. Further, unlike the older reservations considered in the early Strohacker
opinions, the deeds in these new cases reserved the right to “drill” for the reserved
“mineral(s).”
At least three of the new cases found venue in United States District Court. The
first two decided, Webco, Inc. et. al. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation,19 and
Usery v. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation,20 decided by District Judges G. Thomas
Eisele and William R. Wilson, respectively, resulted in summary judgment for the
severed mineral owner, Anadarko, which now owns most of the railroads’ reserved
minerals.21 Those two district judges were persuaded by the records in their respective
cases that, by the 1930's, the word about oil and gas was out, across all of Arkansas.
Indeed, they found that to be a fact not subject to dispute.
The third federal case is pending before Judge Holmes. It is Robertson v.
Union Pacific Railroad Company,22 which involves a 1934 Jackson County
reservation. Judge Holmes has split, somewhat, from Judges Eisele and Wilson. He
denied summary judgment, advancing the case for a trial upon its facts. I predict the
end result will be the same, though it will take longer.

19

E.D. Ark. No. 4:07CV00035 (GTE).

20

E.D. Ark. No. 4:07CV01185 (WRW).

21

The reservation in Webco was in a 1938 deed in Faulkner County; the Usery
reservation was in a 1933 deed in White County.
22

E.D. Ark. No. 1:09CV00020 (JLH).
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The real test case is pending in state court in the form of Froud v. Anadarko,23 a
case filed in White County which now has a pending motion for class certification.
Froud will almost certainly result in an appeal to the Supreme Court. That court’s
opinion will likely answer most, perhaps all, of these new questions.
Remember my comment earlier about teaching some law to those in the shale
counties. That remark is not limited to lawyers. Some of the judges might benefit from
refresher courses, as well. DeSoto Gathering Company is Southwestern Energy
Company’s pipeline subsidiary. As such, DeSoto has the power of eminent domain, but
it did not exercise that right when it laid a pipeline across land in White County
belonging to Richard and Shirley Chandler, and subject to a surface lease in favor of
Janice Smallwood. In this instance DeSoto was operating under both rights granted by
and oil and gas lease and an express easement, both granted by the Chandlers.
The Chandler/Smallwood surface lease was remarkably detailed. Ms.
Smallwood got only the right to use ten acres24 as a single-family residence for life or
until she abandoned the property. Wisely, the Chandlers expressly reserved the power
to “encumber” the property.
Subsequently, the Chandlers leased to Chesapeake Exploration, LLC. A well
was then drilled, and the Chandlers granted a pipeline right of way to DeSoto, which
laid the pipeline.
Ms. Smallwood claimed deliberate trespass to her rights as a surface tenant.

23

White County Circuit Court Case No. 2009-19-1.

24

The entire Chandler tract contained sixty acres.
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She sued and obtained an injunction from the circuit court,25 who ultimately
commanded DeSoto to remove its pipeline. Ms. Smallwood was also awarded
damages of nearly $52,000,26 plus costs.
On direct appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, in DeSoto Gathering
Company v. Smallwood,27 justice, though delayed, was served. The court found the
trial court had abused its discretion, reversed the judgment and remanded with
instructions to dissolve the injunction.
The opinion, by Justice Corbin, is well written. It clearly distinguishes between
the surface leasehold right of Ms. Smallwood and the retained rights, including the
mineral estate and right to encumber of the Chandlers. DeSoto’s activities, being
authorized by persons with the legal power to so authorize, could not be a trespass.
The Fayetteville Shale Play set off an unprecedented leasing boom throughout
much of the eastern half of the state, including in a number of counties which, in
retrospect, did not deserve the attention. Two of our recent cases came from two such
counties. The first of those is Frein v. Windsor Weeping Mary, LP,28 which involved a
lease which should never have been taken. In 2005 Windsor Weeping Mary decided to
lease a 7,000 acre tract in Lee County from the Frein family. Moreover, in a letter
agreement, Windsor Weeping Mary promised to drill a minimum of two wells of

25

Hon. Bill Mills.

26

The trial court tripled her claimed actual damages.

27

2010 Ark. 5, ____ S.W.3d ____ (2010).

28

2009 Ark. App. 774, ____ S.W.3d _____ (2009).
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sufficient depth to test the Fayetteville Shale Formation, within 18 months after the
lease date. The lease did contain the standard language permitting the lessee to
execute a release at any time.
When Windsor Weeping Mary realized that Lee County was not real prospective,
it requested an extension of the 18 month drilling requirement. The Freins refused, so
Windsor Weeping Mary executed and recorded a release of the lease.
The Freins sued, claiming breach of the letter agreement and unjust enrichment.
Both the circuit court and Arkansas Court of Appeals held for Windsor Weeping Mary.
The ruling was that the power to release the lease was not inconsistent with the drilling
requirement of the letter agreement. Therefore, Windsor Weeping Mary could cut its
losses and escape future liability. The court also held that, contrary to the Freins’
contentions, Windsor Weeping Mary had not been unjustly enriched at Frein expense.
Wade A. Whistle, Attorney in Fact for Margaret Whistle Morris v. David H.
Arrington Oil & Gas, Inc.29 involves attempted leasing, by Arrington, in Phillips County,
another place far from the real shale play. Arrington secured the Whistle lease, gave a
time draft for $232,200, and then decided that Phillips County was not a good place to
be drilling. When Whistle presented the draft, dishonor occurred.
In the resulting litigation Arrington argued that its right to approve title as a
condition of payment was at its sole discretion and, also, that Whistle’s title was faulty
because the power-of-attorney under which he acted did not authorize execution of an
oil and gas lease. The second of those arguments may be the best, though Arrington

29

E. D. Ark No. 2:08CV00037 (BSM).
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did not establish that the actual reason for dishonor of the Whistle drafts had anything
to do with the quality of Whistle’s title.
Judge Miller granted summary judgment to Whistle, suggesting a a holding that
the power to approve title within a draft demands an objective, rather than subjective,
test of the lessor’s title. Judge Miller slighted Arrington’s second argument, finding that
Mrs. Morris had later ratified the power-of-attorney, though that occurred after the fact.
Arrington continues to argue that the summary judgment should be withdrawn. It
also contends that the decision is contrary to that of Judge Wright in Falwell v.
American Shale Resources, L.L.C.30 In that case Judge Wright voided the lease
given by Falwell Family Partnership to American Shale when American Shale’s draft
was not timely paid.
The most recent twist on the draft issue came February 19, 2010, in the case of
Trenthem v. David H. Arrington Oil & Gas, Inc.31 The facts are eerily similar to those
of the Whistle case, just discussed, though Trenthem happened in Cleburne County,
where, at least, there is gas. The other difference is that Arrington won the Trenthem
case. It was granted summary judgement by Judge Holmes who ruled that Arrington’s
dishonor of the plaintiffs’ drafts was allowed, under the circumstances.
There is a distinction between Whistle and Trenthem, which explains the
seemingly opposite results. Unlike the situation in Whistle, Arrington was able to show,
in Trenthem, that it became nervous about the Plaintiffs’ title after issuing the drafts

30

W. D. Ark. No. 4:06CV00609 (SWW).

31

W. D. Ark. No. 1:09CV00017 (JLH).
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and before acceptance was due. The Plaintiffs did not dispute that nervousness.
Rather, they relied upon proof that their title was objectively marketable.
According to Arrington and Judge Holmes, marketability is not the issue. Judge
Holmes ruled that Arrington had a right to dishonor based upon disapproval of title,
regardless of that title’s “marketability,” as long as the dishonor was not in bad faith or
fraudulent.
Surface owners in the Fayetteville Shale area absolutely refuse to believe that
the “Limited Warranty Deeds” which they get, nearly for free, from Arkansas’ Land
Commissioner are worthless, though that is nearly always the case. Surface owners
have been the only persons entitled to buy these worthless tax deeds since 2003.32 For
about ten years prior to that, the state was required to keep tax-forfeited severed
mineral interests as a state asset.33 Before 1993, purportedly forfeited severed mineral
interests were auctioned off at public sale, like any other real property interest.34
The tax deed involved in Selrahc Limited Partnership v. SEECO, Inc., et. al.35
was issued in 1973, long before surface owners were given their arguably
unconstitutional preference.36

It involved substantial acreage in several sections in

32

Acts No. 4490-92 of 2003.

33

Acts No. 2458-50 of 1993.

34

See Sadler, Drew, Mineral Rights? The Constitutional Deficiency of
Section 26-37-314 of the Arkansas Code, 62 Ark. Law. Rev. 611, for an interesting
discussion of two of the many constitutional problems with these tax sales.
35

2009 Ark. App. 865, ____ S.W.3d ____ (2009).

36

Id.
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Van Buren County, Arkansas. Selrahc,37 a limited partnership managed by Charles
Roye, and the other appellant, Katrina Roye Peevyhouse, later acquired the purportedly
forfeited interests by deed. Finding that no mineral producer was willing to pay them for
a lease on their alleged interest, Selrahc and Ms. Peevyhouse brought suit, seeking to
quiet their title. They sued the mineral owners whose rights had purportedly been
forfeited, along with those owners’ mineral lessees, a group which included SEECO.38
The Van Buren County Circuit Court39 entered summary judgment for the
defendants. Like in every other county that I am aware of, Van Buren County’s tax
assessor never bothered to subjoin40 mineral and surface assessments, in spite of
numerous cases of the Arkansas Supreme Court41 which required the subjoinder
procedure prior to the effective date of Act No. 961 of 198542 which legislatively
removed the subjoinder requirement.
Selrahc and Ms. Peevyhouse argued both that the statutory change which
abolished the subjoinder mandate should be applied retroactively and that the

37

Which is “Charles,” spelled backward.

38

Actually, this was their second quiet title effort. The first was comically void for
failure to name or notify interested parties on the other side.
39

Hon. Rhonda K. Wood.

40

In this context, “subjoin” means to place the assessment of the severed mineral
interest immediately adjacent to the surface assessment of the same lands on the
assessor’s book.
41

This long line authority began in 1950 with Sorkin v. Myers, 216 Ark. 908, 227
S.W.2d 958. The most recent case, prior to Selrahc, was Gilbreath v. Union Bank, 309
Ark. 360, 830 S.W.2d 854 (2006).
42

Now codified as A.C.A. § 26-26-1112.
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requirement of subjoinder, though it originated from the Supreme Court was, itself,
unconstitutional.43 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a well-written opinion
by Judge Glover. The court said that the issue had been addressed several times by
the Supreme Court and that it was without liberty to overrule those decisions. It noted
that the “retroactivity” argument was available to the Supreme Court in Gilbreath v.
Union Bank44 and that the Supreme Court had declined to apply the 1985 act
retroactively then.
Selrahc and Ms. Peevyhouse have petitioned for review by the Supreme Court.
Perhaps Act No. 421 of 2009, discussed above, will eventually stop such foolishness.45
Not every 2009 Arkansas mineral appellate decision arose in the Shale Play
area. Three, at least, did not. One of those, Reidel v. XTO Energy Inc.46 is a Federal

43

This one has never made sense to me. Apparently the claim is that there are
ways, other than subjoining, to avoid denying a severed mineral owner due process of
law. Thus, the argument goes, for the Supreme Court to prescribe subjoinder and only
subjoinder is a legislative usurpation which unconstitutionally violates the constitutional
principle of separation of powers. I still don’t understand it. The Supreme Court never
told the Legislature that it could not substitute another procedure. Indeed, it invited the
Legislature to do just that in another decision, Dawdy v. Holt, 281 Ark. 171, 662 S.W.2d
818 (1984).
44

Supra.

45

The reported case does not tell you the whole story here. It seems that Charles
(Selrahc spelled backward) Roye owns another company named Galaxy. When no one
else would lease the Roye’s claimed interest, Galaxy stepped up and did so. Galaxy
then obtained drilling permits from the Oil and Gas Commission (swearing, “under
penalty of perjury,” that it had the right to drill), and from the U.S. Forest Service, and
drilled and completed a well in the government’s woods. That well is shut-in and
classified as “temporarily abandoned” by order of the Oil and Gas Commission, which
was less than amused when it learned the story.
46

E.D. Ark. No. 4:07 CV00304 (GTE)
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District Court case containing the allegation that XTO impermissibly deducted postproduction costs from royalty payments. The case was filed as a putative class action.
However, Judge Eisele denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify the putative class. Class
certification was denied because the claims of the putative class are not sufficiently
typical of one another. That typicality is lacking because the putative class members
are subject to numerous different forms of oil and gas leases, with varying language
within their respective royalty clauses.
Judge Eisele also noted the unsettled state of Arkansas’ jurisprudence on the
post-production cost issue. Recall that Arkansas has but two reported cases on that
issue and that those pass like ships in the night.
In Clear Creek Oil & Gas Company v. Bushmiaer,47 the court held that when the
point of sale occurred downstream from the well, the reasonable cost of transporting
the gas to that point was proportionately chargeable to the royalty owner.48 However, in
the later case of Hanna Oil & Gas Company v. Taylor,49 the court refused to allow the
lessee, Hanna, to deduct the cost of compressing the gas to exceed pipeline pressure,
in spite of uncontroverted testimony that there was no market for the uncompressed
gas at the well.50 Hanna had established a long course of conduct of not deducting
compression costs prior to changing its royalty calculation methodology so that they

47

165 Ark. 303, 264 S.W. 830 (1924).

48

Id. at 303, 264 S.W. at 832.

49

297 Ark. 80, 759 S.W.2d 563 (1988).

50

Id. at 85, 759 S.W. 2d at 566-67
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were deducted.51 It is unclear whether the court’s decision in Hanna resulted from that
change in Hanna’s course of conduct, or whether it was a tacit reversal of Clear Creek.
Normally, the trend appears to be to base the deductibility of these “post-production”
costs upon whether there was, in fact, a market at the well.
One rationale, originating in Oklahoma52 and then perverted beyond recognition
in Colorado,53 is to tie this issue to the common law implied covenant to market. Thus,
we have the “first marketable product rule.” The lessee’s implied obligations under the
lease require the production, free of costs other than taxes, of a marketable product at
the mouth of the well. If no such market exists, the reasonable costs of getting to
market are deductible. Likewise, if the lessee enhances the value of marketable gas to
facilitate a higher price, the additional reasonable cost of doing so is proportionately
charged to the royalty share.54
Other jurisdictions (Arkansas among them, were it not for Hanna) base their
determination solely upon the express language of the lease. Thus, a lease form may
specify which costs, or no costs, are deductible.55 The lease’s express language calls
for calculation based upon sales at the well. If there are none of those, a calculated
sales price is the measure. That price is calculated by taking the first sale, made away

51

Id. at 81, 759 S.W.2d at 564.

52

Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 903 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1994).

53

54

Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co. 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001).
Mittlestaedt, supra.

55

Remember that severance taxes and conservation assessments are charged
against all owners, by statute, however.
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from the well, and deducting the reasonable cost of getting the gas to that sale point, in
salable condition. I am not sure that either of the above rationales makes much
difference to the end result. It seems that jurisdictions are either liberal in allowing
deduction of post-production costs,56 restrictive,57confused58 or totally nuts.59
Regardless, this is an area quite ripe for con-tortsion and, thus, is popular with class
action plaintiffs’ lawyers.60
One of the two non-Arkansas cases demanding attention this year involves this
very issue. The North Dakota case of Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C.61 was a certified class
action.62 The class sought damages for royalty underpayment alleged to have resulted
from improper deduction of post-production costs. The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment for the producer, thus placing that
jurisdiction in the “at the well”/net-back camp and rejecting the first marketable product
approach. Using the Liberal/Restrictive/Confused/Totally Nuts test invented above,
count North Dakota liberal.

56

i.e., Texas.

57

i.e., Oklahoma.

58

i.e., Arkansas.

59

i.e., Colorado.

60

For a thorough discussion of the state of post-production costs’ law see France,
Lisa-Marie, Deciding to Tolerate Ambiguity: Rogers v. Westerman Farms Co. and
“at the well language” to Determine Royalty Allocation in Oil and Gas Leases, 56
Ark. Law Rev. 903.
61

768 N.W.2d 496 (N.D. 2009)

62

Unlike Reidel, supra.
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All of this, somewhat awkwardly, transitions to our discussion of Sutton v.
Sutton,63 the case that is correct in spite of its opinion. Ronald and Bonnie Sutton are
the parents of Lonnie Sutton, who was formerly married to Lorene Sutton. While
Lonnie and Lorene were married, the four Suttons purchased a farm in Scott County
from William and Etta White. The Whites deeded only to Ronald and Bonnie64 and
reserved a one-half mineral interest.
Then, two years later but before the deed was recorded, Lonnie and Lorene’s
names were added to the deed by interlineation. Later, almost ten years after originally
acquiring the farm, Ronald and Bonnie conveyed it, by warranty deed, to Lonnie.65 That
warranty deed, which is the principal one involved in the litigation, purports to reserve a
one-half mineral interest to the grantors, Ronald and Bonnie. Next Lonnie quit-claimed
his interest to Lorene.66 According to the Supreme Court’s opinion, that “quit-claim
deed also reserved fifty percent of the mineral rights,” but that was a misstatement of
the facts. Actually the “mineral reservation” in the quit-claim deed merely purported to
acknowledge the reservation in the warranty deed previously given Lonnie by his
parents.
The question before the Court was “who owns the minerals under the farm?” Of
course, the Whites own a one-half interest. That is the easy part. What about the

63

2009 Ark. 109, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2009).

64

The reason for that is unexplained.

65

But not to Lorene.

66

Possibly the younger couple was getting divorced.
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other half? That involves Texas’ Duhig rule,67 as domesticated here in two contrasting
Arkansas cases, Peterson v. Simpson68 and Hill v. Gilliam,69 which were decided in the
same term-of-court, in 1985. Duhig requires the subtraction of any outstanding mineral
reservation from any new exception or reservation unless the new reservation is clearly
and expressly made in addition to the previous one. In Arkansas, Duhig applies to
warranty deeds70 but not to quit-claim deeds.71 The express purpose of Duhig’s
application is to provide a bright-line rule of property to relieve innocent purchasers for
value of the duty to ascertain the specific intent of previous grantors in warranty deeds.
The doctrine applies to warranty deeds but not quit-claim deeds because, in a warranty
deed, the warranty trumps inconsistent ambiguous language of reservation or
exception. Not so in a quit-claim deed, which has no such warranty.
Thus, according to the Supreme Court, Lorene owns the missing one-half
mineral interest. Ronald and Bonnie’s “reservation” failed because of Duhig. While the
Court fails to make this clear, Lonnie’s reservation also failed, because it was not really
a reservation.

But wait!

Who said any of these Suttons were innocent purchasers without

notice? They are all kinfolks, sort of. That is the tricky part of my conclusion that the
67

From Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d. 878

(1940).
68

286 Ark. 177, 690 S.W.2d 737 (1985).
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284 Ark. 383, 692 S.W.2d 737 (1985).

70

Peterson, supra.

71

Hill, supra.
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result in the case is correct.72 Here is the explanation. Sutton was an action to quiet
title, brought by Ronald and Bonnie. In a quiet title action a plaintiff must prevail upon
the strength of his own title. Ronald and Bonnie should have brought an action for
reformation of their warranty deed to conform to the parties’ intents.73 Had that
occurred, the court would have been squarely presented with the intent issue and likely
would never have needed Duhig at all.
Arkansas Department of Enviornmental Quality v. Oil Producers of
Arkansas74 deserves mention, though its appellate career, so far, has been only
interlocutory. Oil Producers sued ADEQ to prevent enforcement of ADEQ’s “reserve pit
environmental permit” requirement. Oil Producers contend that the permit requirement
is an unauthorized regulation which is also an ultra vires usurpation of the Oil and Gas
Commission’s jurisdiction.
ADEQ moved to dismiss, claiming the suit was barred by sovereign immunity.75
Bad theory. The case goes on.
The final 2009 case is out of Indiana. It is Cimarron Oil Corp. v. Howard

72

Though its opinion is likely to be widely misunderstood.

73

They are, after all, almost the same parties. Although Lorene was not a party
to the warranty deed she obviously had contemporaneous knowledge of its intent.
Indeed, she testified, contrary to her own interest, that she believed Ronald and Bonnie
had reserved a mineral interest.
74

2009 Ark. 297, 285 S.W.3d 654 (2009)

75

Remember that up to 7% of your income goes, in part, to pay assistant
attorneys general to make such inane arguments and support the various state courts
whose valuable time is wasted where they are made and, ultimately, rejected. Makes
me want to go throw a tea bag into Bayou DeView.
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Energy Corp.76 We have been keeping score of jurisdictions’ rulings on the ownership
of coal bed methane gas in controversies between the separate owners of coal and gas
under the same lands. We do so because Arkansas, which has coal bed methane
production,77 has never decided the issue. Score one, tentatively, for the coal guys
here. Remember, however, that like Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Kentucky,
Indiana is a traditional coal mining state. In those jurisdictions it seems that there are
two classes of minerals, coal and everything else.
Well, that wraps up another report. Tune in again next year. There are a lot of
cases on their way up, including interpretations of Arkansas’ statutory Pugh clause, the
Supreme Court’s final disposition of Selrahc, challenges to eminent domain powers of
gathering companies and much, much more. I am going to return to having fun so I can
be back in a flash.

76

909 N.E.2d 1115 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

77

From wells in Sebastian and Scott Counties.
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Recent Developments in
Natural Resources Law–2010
Update

By Thomas A. Daily

Recent Legislation


Act No. 719 of 20091 defines the
“prudent operator” standard under an
oil and gas lease.


1Now codified as A.C.A. § 15-73-207.

Recent Legislation


Act No. 1183 of 20091 requires that an
oil and gas lessor be given notice of the
first assignment of his lease, if the
assignment occurs within 24 months
after the lease’s execution.


1Now codified as A.C.A. § 15-73-208.

Recent Legislation




Act No. 421 of 20091 is my personal favorite
of all of the 2009 Legislature’s work. That act
sets the ad valorem tax value of a nonproducing mineral interest at “zero (0) value.”
The purpose of this much-needed piece of
legislation is to cure an obvious illegality in
the ad valorem taxation of mineral interests.
1Now codified as part of A.C.A. § 26-26-1110.

Recent Legislation


Act No. 1175 of 2009 was an Oil and Gas
Commission sponsored bill which made
numerous technical changes to Arkansas’ oil
and gas statutes. Its most notable sections
are Section 1, which clarified that five
affirmative votes are required for the
Commission to issue an order, and Sections
15 and 17 which amended A.C.A. § 15-72304 and A.C.A. § 15-74-604, respectively, to
permit royalty or other proceeds of production
to accumulate up to $100 before requiring
payment.

Recent Legislation


Act No. 389 of 20091 reduces the
qualifying age of an oil and gas
commissioner from 30 to 21 and
requires that a majority of those2 be
persons “experienced in development,
production or transportation of oil or
gas.”



1Amending A.C.A. § 15-71-102 (b).
2The previous version said “four.”

Recent Legislation


Act No. 452 of 20091 transferred
certain authority to enforce the Federal
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968
from the Arkansas Public Service
Commission to the Oil and Gas
Commission.


1Amending A.C.A. § 15-71-110 (d)(18).

Recent Cases


Strohacker Cases:








Webco, Inc. et. al. v. Anadarko
Petroleum Corporation
Usery v. Anadarko Petroleum
Corporation
Robertson v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company
Froud v. Anadarko

Recent Cases


DeSoto Gathering Company v.
Smallwood

Recent Cases


Frein v. Windsor Weeping Mary, LP

Recent Cases


The Lease Draft Cases






Falwell v. American Shale Resources,
L.L.C.
Wade A. Whistle, Attorney in Fact for
Margaret Whistle Morris v. David H.
Arrington Oil & Gas, Inc.
Trenthem v. David H. Arrington Oil &
Gas, Inc.

Recent Cases


Selrahc Limited Partnership v.
SEECO, Inc., et. al.

Recent Cases


The Post-Production Costs Cases










Reidel v. XTO Energy Inc.
Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C.

It seems that jurisdictions are either liberal in
allowing deduction of post-production costs,1
restrictive,2confused3 or totally nuts.4
1i.e., Texas.
2i.e., Oklahoma.
3i.e., Arkansas.
4i.e., Colorado.

Recent Cases


Sutton v. Sutton

Recent Cases


Arkansas Department of
Environmental Quality v. Oil
Producers of Arkansas
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